Future consumer mobile phone security: a case study using the data centric security model by Cleeff, Andre van
Future consumer mobile phone security:
a case study using the data centric security model
Andre´ van Cleeff
University of Twente
P.O.Box 217
7500 AE Enschede
The Netherlands
a.vancleeff@ewi.utwente.nl
September 16, 2008
1 Introduction
In the interconnected world that we live in, traditional security barriers are
broken down. Developments such as outsourcing, increased usage of mobile
devices and wireless networks each cause new security problems.
To address the new security threats, a number of solutions have been sug-
gested, mostly aiming at securing data rather than whole systems or networks.
However, these visions (such as proposed by the Jericho Forum [9] and IBM
[4]) are mostly concerned with large (inter-) enterprise systems. Until now, it is
unclear what data-centric security could mean for other systems and environ-
ments. One particular category of systems that has been neglected is that of
consumer mobile phones. Currently, data security is usually limited to a PIN
number on startup and the option to disable wireless connections. The lack of
protection does not seem justified, as these devices have steadily increased in
capabilities and capacity; they can connect wirelessly to the Internet and have
a high risk of being lost or stolen [8]. This not only puts end users at risk, but
also their contacts, as phones can contain privacy sensitive data of many others.
For example, if birth dates and addresses are kept with the contact records, in
many cases a thief will have enough information to impersonate a contact and
steal his identity.
Could consumer mobile phones benefit from data-centric security? How
useful is data-centric security in this context? These are the core questions we
will try to address here.
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2 The current status of mobile phone security
How serious the physical security threat to mobile phones is, becomes clear when
we look at theft statistics. In the UK, an estimated 710.000 mobile phone thefts
occurred in 2001 [8], which increased to over 2.6 million in 2006 [7], or one phone
every 12 seconds. The direct costs of loss and theft were estimated at £390
million. Two particular mechanisms that have been implemented to counter
theft are the blocking of the phone from the network using the phone’s unique
IMEI number, and tracking the phone’s location while it is still connected to
the network [13]. However, these mechanisms cannot solve the physical security
problem; small items like mobile phones that are carried around will be lost and
stolen, no matter how much effort is put in prevention. Phone loss can even be
an unintended consequence of a car or bag theft.
Another issue is that mobile phones are becoming the target of viruses,
worms, and Trojan horses: Even if the phone is under physical control of the
user, data could still be stolen from it. Already, several phones (Apple’s iPhone,
Nokia’s N95) have storage capacity that is measured in gigabytes. How to keep
all this data secure should therefore be a core objective for improving mobile
phone security.
To understand what data security actually entails, we will discuss one par-
ticular model called the ”data centric security model” or DCSM [4] and as a
case study, apply it to mobile phones.
3 The data centric security model
The DCSM was developed by IBM to solve two major problems in achieving
(cost) effective security:
1. how to apply security measures proportionally to the value of the systems
they protect.
2. how to allow high-level specification of IT policies that can be implemented
at lower (technical) levels without distortion.
These problems are solved in the following way:
As a paradigm, the focus in the DCSM is on deriving the right security level,
based on a business analysis of the data being handled. This data classification
then drives the properties and access control policies governing the use of data
by applications that implement business processes. Security services and their
underlying mechanisms can be abstracted into interfaces that directly support
data management policies. [4, p86]
If we look into the details of the model and how to interpret it, we find that
the ’model’ of the DCSM actually consists of several different elements:
1. The DCSM as a paradigm for managing security, as discussed before
2. The DCSM as a methodology for implementing appropriate security
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3. the DCSM as a means of deployment for security mechanisms
4. The DCSM as a maturity model for IT security
Here we look at the latter three.
3.1 Methodology
In applying the DCSM, the first step is to gather business requirements and
regulations. These are used to classify the data, for example based on the owner
and given security requirements. Classification can be done using criteria such
as origin, ownership, control, data holder and data type. Next, we formulate
policies about how the data should be handled. We define who can use the data,
how long it can be stored and what safeguards should be in place. In turn, these
policies can be implemented using the appropriate security mechanisms. This
is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: High level view of DCSM methodology
3.2 Deployment
Secure operation is made possible by a security infrastructure that handles tasks
such as identity management, access control and safe transport. Access to the
data is only possible via the data control layer or DCL, which utilizes the security
infrastructure. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
3.3 Maturity model
To help organizations implement the DCSM gradually, it comes with a maturity
model of four adoption levels. These levels are shown in Table 1.
Adoption levels Basic Intermediate Advanced Full
Security infrastructure X X X X
Business data classification X X X
Role definitions X X X
Policies by classification X X X
Labeled data X X
Data flow analysis X X
Automatic policy provisioning X
Table 1: DCSM maturity model [4, p93]
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Figure 2: DCSM Deployment model [4, p89]
4 Case study on mobile phones
Now that the DCSM has been discussed, we will do a case study on its applica-
tion to mobile phones. Obviously, this requires a case study subject - we need
a reference mobile phone implementation to which we can apply it. Here, our
reference point is loosely based on the Nokia N95 8GB. Its market introduction
was in the first quarter of 2008; at that time, it was the Nokia flagship con-
sumer mobile phone. Network connections are possible via 3G mobile networks,
WLAN, Bluetooth, infrared and USB. Data synchronization with a PC is pos-
sible for items such as contacts and calendar events. The entire file contents is
accessible via USB. Additional software is available to connect to sites such as
Flickr to upload photos. A schematic overview is given in figure 3.
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Figure 3: Reference phone in context
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In applying the DCSM, we also need to consider what viewpoint should be
used; the deployment, the paradigm, the methodology, the maturity model, or
a mixture of these? Here we choose to concentrate on the maturity model. The
intent is to show how consumer mobile phone security can be improved step by
step, using a data-centric approach. For each level, we state the requirements
of the DCSM and elaborate how they could be implemented.
4.1 Adoption level 1: Basic
DCSM requirements At this level a baseline security infrastructure is in
place, covering all information assets, ranging from critical to non-critical. As
a result, some assets will be over protected, while others are insufficiently pro-
tected. The baseline security infrastructure provides the foundation on top of
which more complicated policies can be enforced later.
Elaboration and implementation For PCs there is already a consensus
about what the essential security mechanisms should be, such as a firewall,
anti-virus, anti-spyware and automatic patch management. These would also
be required for mobile phones. Added to that, the basic security infrastructure
for mobile phones should provide extra authentication and data storage security
mechanisms.
Concerning authentication, there is a problem with password authentica-
tion. Mobiles phones are not used continuously and for adequate security, the
user should authenticate again after every break. This hinders usability and
therefore most users only type in the password (the PIN number) when the
device is powering up. It would be better to complement the password with a
finger print reader (so called two-factor authentication). This allows for quick
authentication. For example, when a mobile phone is lent out to other per-
sons to make a phone call, there would be no need to access all content on the
phone. Fingerprint readers have already been implemented in a limited number
of devices such as those from Toshiba [15].
An additional feature could be to implement different user accounts. As
mobile devices are personal, they normally have just one account; For example
Windows Mobile only has privilege levels [10].
Other required data security mechanisms would be:
• Encryption of all content on the device
• Automatic and remote backups
• Remote wiping software
Encryption is already available for BlackBerry smartphones [12]. Backup func-
tions are also becoming more common, but then in the form of synchronizations;
For example the iPhone can be used in combination with the MobileMe website
[1] using so called ’Push technology’, all servers are notified of changes in one lo-
cation, which are then propagated to other sites. With wireless 3G connections
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Figure 4: Application of fingerprint reader
this can even be done remotely. Remote wiping is also an interesting addition
to the security: In case the phone is stolen but a network connection is still
present, the phone can be controlled remotely to prevent possible data theft.
This is already implemented in some applications, such as Guardian Mobile [5].
4.2 Adoption level 2: Intermediate
DCSM requirements The second maturity level includes all requirements
from the previous level. Added to that, data is classified and the protection
levels are determined for each data category. Each system (or component) is
protected based on the most critical data that is handled by it.
Elaboration The first step is to define the requirements and applicable reg-
ulations.
Requirements For business, this step starts with assessing the business
value of the data, for example in terms of losses when confidentiality, integrity
and availability are breached. Data classification is ideally driven by the value
of the data, which is related to the business processes that are supported by it.
Security measures are taken proportionally to the value of the data; It is up to
a business to determine the appropriate security and cost level.
For consumers, the situation is different, as the data does not serve a business
process and is not linked to any profit. There is no CEO or CIO that can state
business rules and regulations. The cost- security tradeoff is also different; One
of the reasons that consumer mobile phone security is at such a low level is
that few individuals are willing to pay for additional security measures; extra
security precautions might be effective but hinder usability. Some noticeable
differences between the business and consumer situation are shown in Table 2.
Regarding confidentiality, the most obvious consumer requirement would be
privacy protection. Unfortunately, it is hard to place any monetary value on
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Aspect Business Consumer
Data value Related to business value Related to personal needs
such as privacy
Applicable rules Top-down, from the CEO and
legal requirements
Personal, undefined
Impact of security
breach
Financial losses, threat to
business continuity
Loss of privacy, extra work to
recover data
Main security
tradeoff
Security - cost Security - cost/usability
Table 2: Differences between business and consumer situation
privacy (for an attempt to price on-line privacy, see Hann e.a. [6] ). Regarding
integrity and availability, we need to consider the hassle of data loss and the
value of a personal archive of data - such as vacation photos and emails. Items
such as contact data can be recovered from other sources in many cases, for
photos this might not be possible. Another requirement is that of usability:
The device should provide adequate security for privacy sensitive data, with as
little user intervention as possible. In addition, data integrity and availability
must be assured.
Regulations There are many regulations about data storage and process-
ing. As for data security requirements, one of the most notable in the EU is
the data directive [2], but this is not concerned with data usage by individuals
and households. Some exceptions include regulations concerning copyright and
adult content. Other problems arise when the device is also used for business
purposes. Data gathered for a business could be subjected to privacy regula-
tions. An example would be sent and received email. As a whole, regulations
(and enforced compliance) are not a big concern for consumers and we will
ignore them accordingly.
Data classification The next step in the DCSM is to classify the data.
Type of data Typical data items stored on mobile phones are:
• Calendar events (including todo items and notes)
• Contacts
• Messages (text and multimedia messages, emails)
• Images
• Sound files (music, voice memos)
• Video clips (movies, clips)
• Office documents (PDF, MS Word, MS Excel)
7
• Logs (call and synchronization records)
• Preferences settings (alarms and backgrounds)
• Security settings (email connection and passwords, WLAN keys).
Ownership and control Because the mobile phone is a personal device,
the owner will normally be the main user. However copyright might reside at
another party, as is the case for received emails and music. (Again, the situation
is different when the phone is used for business purposes.) As a whole, ownership
of the files is of no particular interest here - what is on the phone should be
fully accessible to the phone owner.
Data origin The first distinction here is between data that is captured
using the device (audio, images, videos) and data that is transferred to it. The
latter could be divided into three parts:
• Personal data
• Data from friends or personal contacts (such as pictures sent by Bluetooth)
• Third party data (with whom there is no direct relation, such as music).
Data value Next we determine the particular value of the data. We pro-
pose to do the valuation based on the potential impact of a security breach:
• In terms of loss of confidentiality
– disclosure of private information of the owner
– disclosure of private information or from other persons
– disclosure of security information for other systems
• In terms of loss of integrity
• In terms of availability
– Loss of useful data that can be recovered from other sources
– Loss of useful data that cannot be recovered from other sources
Integrity will be ignored here, and we group the data together in two dimen-
sions: Public (non-confidential or third party) versus private, and recoverable
versus non-recoverable.
Public (non-confidential) Private (confidential)
Recoverable I III
Non-recoverable II IV
Table 3: Data groups
Data in group IV has the highest value, followed by III, II and I. Next we
put the data types in the different groups:
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Group Data type
I Multimedia - third party
II Preferences settings
III Messages, Calendar, Contacts, Multimedia -
received from friends, Logs,Security settings
IV Multimedia - user created, Notes
Table 4: Data types and groups
Policy aspects For each of the data groups we need to define policies. In
this case study we will focus on just three policies:
• How are backup made? (daily / on creation or change)
• Is the data encrypted or not?
• What rules apply on export? (user confirmation, target system must be
trusted)
This could lead to the following policy-data matrix shown in Table 5.
Group Backup policy Encryption policy Export policy
I Daily Unencrypted None
II Daily Unencrypted User confirmation
III On creation or change Encrypted User confirmation, trust re-
quired
IV On creation or change Encrypted User confirmation, trust re-
quired
Table 5: Data types and groups
Implementation Each application that uses one of these data items would
need to apply the highest security level of all the data items it handles. When
a user installs a new application, the application will request permissions for
certain data items and connections. For example, a map application might
use the Internet connection to download updated map information, but is not
capable of accessing any contact data.
4.3 Adoption level 3: Advanced
DCSM requirements The third maturity level includes all requirements
from the previous two levels. Here, all data and communication channels are
labeled at runtime. An application processing a particular data item will select
the appropriate policy automatically.
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Implementation Newly received images, emails and SMSes are all labeled
according to their source of origin and other classifications. One way to achieve
this is to attempt to link the data to a particular person or group of persons -
then specific policies could be applied which hold for this person. This results in
a more refined security model than was described at the second maturity level.
Unclassified data (for example images) resides in a queue, for later processing.
Connections Connections with other devices and applications such as
PCs and online-sharing websites are also labeled. For example, personal pic-
tures cannot be sent to a sharing website unless SSL is used and authorization
controls are in use on that site. The same is true when connecting the device
using USB to an unknown computer. Pictures can be watermarked before ex-
port, such that in case of a security breach, the source of the breach can be
found.
4.4 Adoption level 4: Full
DCSM requirements The fourth maturity level includes all requirements
from the previous three levels. At this level, policy management is automated.
A generic policy can be specified top-down and automatically implemented
by different systems. Vice versa, policies from different systems are gathered
bottom-up and checked for compliance with the high-level policy.
Implementation The phone provides a unified security configuration, to
which all applications must conform. The operating system employs a capa-
bility security model, meaning that each application can request data items,
but the OS decides whether this is allowed. Data access is also logged, and
periodically checked for compliance with the policies.
5 Conclusions
We have discussed the data centric security model in detail, and demonstrated
its application in a case study of consumer mobile phones. This resulted in a
model for stepwise improvements of their security.
On the whole, we found the DCSM to be quite well applicable in a consumer
situation, outside of its intended business scope. It was possible to split up the
different types of data, and define appropriate security levels. One noticeable
problem is the second maturity level; if an end-user device or application has to
be configured at the highest security level of the data it is going to handle, the
usability will be very low. In this case, intermediate and advanced levels could
better be merged.
A point for discussion is how much effort should be put in classifying data.
If the baseline policy is to encrypt all data, is it worth to spend additional effort
in securing different types of data with specific encryption methods?
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One omission of the DCSM seems to be that it does not take the program
data itself into account. Data can only be secure if the programs that use it are
also secure - but these programs consist of data themselves. This program data
might not have direct business value, but when compromised (for example due
to a rootkit), the security of other valuable data is at risk. Securing program
data could be a requirement for baseline security, but maybe a more elegant
solution is possible, by treating program data as a special data type.
As for the maturity model itself, we see several applications. First, it could
be used to create a guideline for consumers. With it, they can make informed
decisions about which phone to buy and afterward determine how much effort
they want to put in securing their data; In general, the higher the maturity
level, the more configuration needs to be done.
Obviously, it is up to developers to implement the security mechanisms first.
For this, the maturity model can serve as a roadmap for the development of more
secure mobile phones. The first step in the implementation would be to create
the data control layer in the operating system. Secondly, a standard model for
policies is needed, that could be implemented by different applications. One
interesting development here is the Android operating system, the new and
open source mobile platform from Google [3]. Its availability would allow to
implement new security features and distribute them to end users at little cost.
Combined, this puts security in the hands of both developers and end-users:
Ultimately, mobile phone security is their call.
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